Volume 83

Issue 2

Article 5

December 1980

Essay--Prejudgment Attachments and the Concept of the Neutral
Magistrate: A Tale of Two Cases
James Audley McLaughlin
West Virginia University College of Law, james.mclaughlin@mail.wvu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
James A. McLaughlin, Essay--Prejudgment Attachments and the Concept of the Neutral Magistrate: A
Tale of Two Cases, 83 W. Va. L. Rev. (1980).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol83/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

McLaughlin: Essay--Prejudgment Attachments and the Concept of the Neutral Mag

ESSAY-PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENTS
AND THE CONCEPT OF THE NEUTRAL
MAGISTRATE: A TALE OF TWO CASES
JAMES AUDLEY MCLAUGHLIN*

They went too far; they did not go far enough. That is the
story of two cases from West Virginia's highest court. Taken together they create substantial doubt as to the present status of
prejudgment remedies in West Virginia, especially the remedies
of attachment and garnishment. The first case, Persingerv. Edwin Associates, Inc.,1 held the West Virginia attachment-garnishment procedures2 to be constitutional, despite the lack of
preseizure notice and hearing and despite "the lack of a judge [or
other judicial officer] personally issuing the writ."3 The second
case, State ex rel. Yanero v. Fox,4 held the state's detinue statute5 to be unconstitutional and declared "whenever the government for itself or for litigants, takes property from the possession
of a person, a pre-seizure hearing [is necessary]. 1 7 '!Article III,
[section] 10, of the West Virginia Constitution demands it. This
is so, whatever the ex parte affidavits by the would be possessor,
or how clothed with authority the magistrate who would order the
seizure. '" s At least the discussion in these cases suggests that
Yanero overruled Persinger,yet the court in Yanero, with ample
opportunity to expressly disapprove of Persinger, discusses
Persingeras if it is perfectly viable.9
This essay will argue that the best answer to the prejudgment remedy dilemma lies somewhere between Yanero and
* Professor, West Virginia University College of Law; B.A., 1962, Ohio State

University; J.D., 1965, Ohio State University.

1 230 S.E.2d 460 (W. Va. 1976).
2 W. VA. CODE § 38-7-1 to -46 (1966 & Cum. Supp. 1980).

230 S.E.2d at 464.
4 256 S.E.2d 751 (W.Va. 1979).
'

'

W. VA.

CODE

§ 55-6-1 to -7 (1981 Replacement Vol.).

256 S.E.2d at 751 (syllabus pt. 2 by the court).
(syllabus pt. 1 by the court).
8 Id. at 757.
O
7Id.

9 Id.
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Persinger. Yanero goes farther in restricting ex parte prejudgment procedure than is required by the federal procedural due
process cases which it purports, up to a point, to follow."0
in Yanero the court, after discussing Sniadach v. Family Finance, Corp. and its progeny,11 rejected the federal test, which it
viewed as a "balancing test," and declared such "rational balancing tests [to be] vehicles for judicial sophistry. 11 2 It opted instead
for an absolute rule under the West Virginia Constitution which
it determined to require notice and hearing prior to seizure. However, the absolute notice and hearing rule fails to recognize important remedial interests which can be protected without ad hoc
balancing 13'and with as much simplicity as an absolute notice and
hearing rule. Therefore Yanero goes farther in prescribing procedure for prejudgment seizure than is wise. Moreover, although the
modem doctrine of civil procedural due process is based on the
balancing of competing interests,1 ' the specific branch relating to
prejudgment civil seizures, which flows from Sniadach, does not
call for balancing on an individual case basis. This line of cases
results in a test of constitutionality which requires as much judicial discretion as the reading of litmus paper.
On the other hand in Persingerthe West Virginia Court did
not go far enough in restricting ex parte prejudgment seizures.
Although the rationale for the fairness of the West Virginia procedure contained in Justice Flower's opinion in Persingeris quite
plausible, 5 such rationale misconceives the federal doctrine it
Id. at 753-56.
" Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); North Geor10

gia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
Is 256 S.E.2d at 757.
"3 "Ad hoc balancing" is a process to test the constitutionality of govermental
action by balancing its pros and cons in each case rather than determining
whether or not it satisfies certain criteria, i.e., satisfies a rule.
The phrase, "ad hoc balancing," is mentioned in T. EMERSON, TOWARD A THEORY OF THE FIrST AMENDMENT 53-56 (1966).
14 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
1 230 S.E.2d at 464; Justice Flowers states: "The statement of material facts

in the affidavit must be certain and definite so as to inform those who may defend
of the facts they must repel." (emphasis added).
This may be a plausible reason and consistent with prior West Virginia cases,
but it is not what the United States Supreme Court had in mind as the discussion
below will show. Nor does a "clerk, an officer of the court", id. at 464, qualify as "a
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purports to apply.
This "going too far" and "not far enough" in restricting ex
parte prejudgment process is a result of ignoring a key concept
implicit in such federal cases as Mitchell v. W. T. Grant" and
North GeorgiaFinishing,Inc. v. Di-Chem Inc.17 The key concept
is that of the neutral, experienced fact-finder interposed between
the citizen, whose person or property is seized, and the interested
party initiating the seizure. This concept was first developed in
fourth amendment cases, 18 which explore the public law side of
prejudgment seizures of the ex parte variety.
This essay will briefly explore the theoretical basis of this
"neutral magistrate concept" and attempt to demonstrate that
this idea is indeed at the heart of Di-Chem and the line of cases
which flow from it. In order to form a basis for judging the tenet
of this essay, one must first review some relevant history and
background.
I. CWivL PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
"Civil procedural due process" as a judicially articulated and
applied federal constitutional doctrine is a recent development.
Prior to 1969 the only instances of state procedure held to be violative of due process in the civil context involved lack of adequatenotice of a trial that would permanently deprive a defendant of
traditional "property."1 9 Since the requirement of notice and a
trial prior to permanent deprivation existed throughout the
United States, no federal superintending of state civil procedure
was necessary. Occasionally correcting the quality of notice was

judicial officer" or other discretion exercising official within the meaning of Mitch-

ell and Di-Chem. In those cases the clerk was contrasted with a judicial officer.
Moreover, the clerk's "determination that the statutory mandates have been met,"
230 S.E.2d at 464, merely requires a clerical checking to see that all the blanks, so
to speak, are filled in. It is not the kind of "independent judgment of probable

cause" that Mitchell and Di-Chem call for. But see text accompanying note 47,
infra.
"6416 U.S. 600 (1974).
17 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
"a See text accompanying notes 34 - 42, infra.
'9 See, e.g., Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931). For a general discussion and recitation of pre-1969 cases see Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.,

416 U.S. at 611-14.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1980

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 5

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

the sum of pre-1969 civil procedural due process decisions. 20 Until
that time the only deprivations subject to judicial scrutiny were
permanent deprivations of interests that have traditionally been
regarded as "property," e.g., interests in money, securities, chattels, real estate. Temporary deprivations of traditional property
and deprivation of what may be termed "new property"2 1 in government benefits, such as welfare payments or social security,
were not protected by notice and a hearing. The unspoken rationale of the courts was that temporary deprivations were too trifling
to be of constitutional concern, and, regardless, mistaken deprivations could be corrected in the final reckoning after trial; government benefits were a "privilege," not "property," and therefore
22
not subject to due process protection.
Beginning with Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,2s decided
in 1969, this changed. That case involved a temporary deprivation
of traditional property-subsistence wages. The temporariness of
such a deprivation is hardly trifling when in the interim one cannot feed, clothe or house oneself. This new concern about temporary -deprivations soon lost its mooring in wage garnishment, and
temporary deprivations of all types came under judicial
2
scrutiny. '
At first these cases seemed to suggest that once the deprivation became more than trifling only notice and an evidentiary
hearing would satisfy due process. Mitchell25 laid that notion to
rest and Di Chem26 did not resurrect it. Procedural due process is
not synonymous with notice and a hearing. This is likewise true
in the parallel development of civil procedural due process involving governmental largess-the "new property" labeled "entitlements"-although here also initial cases suggested otherwise.

20 See,

e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
A phrase first used in Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1963).
22 Cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972), where the right/
privilege distinction was dismissed out of hand; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969). For a recent comment see Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 71 (1979)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
22 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
24 See, e.g., North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 608
(1975).
25 416 U.S. 600.
26 419 U.S. 601.
21
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The first case of this genre was Goldberg v. Kelley,'27 and the
interest of the individual was again subsistence; and "due process" was still synonymous with "notice and hearing." But subsequent cases demonstrate that deprivation of any government benefit (including
employment and licenses) to which one is
"entitled"28 is subject to due process scrutiny. Moreover, it has
been clear since Justice Powell prevailed in Mathews v. Eldridge,2" that notice and a hearing in many cases is not essential
to satisfy due process. In this "new property" area of civil procedural due process, ad hoc balancing is utilized for testing the constitutional validity of governmental procedures "depriving" one of
"benefits". The procedure one is due depends upon, as Mr. Justice Powell states:
[c]onsideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail. 0

This "test"8 1 is highly subjective, and in spite of Justice Pow397 U.s. 254 (1970).
" See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
:9 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
27

0oId. at 335.
If one puts this "ad hoc balancing test" in balancing language, pretending
for the sake of clarity that each factor can be quantified, the Powell "rule" looks
like this: on one side of the scale goes the value of the individual interest lost (say,
eight for subsistence welfare benefits on a scale of ten, five for social security on
the same scale, four for a drivers license, three for a liquor license) times the reduction in the risk of errors disfavoring the individual that will be caused by using
the procedure claimed to be claimant's due over the challenged procedure presently used (say five per cent mistaken applications under present procedure (one
in twenty people deserving (by law) of welfare do not get it) whereas using proposed procedure there will only be three percent (one in thirty-three) mistaken
applications for a net improvement or decrease in risk of mistaken denials of two
percent, one in fifty, or for every 100 hundred applications two people formally
wrongfully denied benefits will now get them although even under the proposed
system three people in every hundred still will be mistakenly denied benefits); on
the other side of the balance is the increase in all "costs" of the proposed system
over the present-the costs being the fiscal cost of the proposed procedure (e.g.,
cost of hearing officers & hearing rooms) and the cost of delay in decision-making
"1
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eli's heroic application of it in Mathews, does seem, as Justice
Harshbarger insists in Yanero, a perfect vehicle for "judicial
sophistry." I frankly believe that Powell's clear articulation of the
intuition of procedural fairness, showing the patently subjective
nature of the intuition, was meant to pave the way for its eventuan demise as an active component of constitutional jurispru82
dence. It is every bit as subjective as substantive due process
and will in the future be used more and more sparingly to second
guess legislative determiniation of the best procedure for applying
its laws to individual cases. Subjective judgments can only fairly
be made in a democracy by some informed majority process, i.e.,
the legislature. After this legislative judgment is made, only patent misbalancing should be judicially checked.
Whatever its value or its implications for the future, the fact
is that the Mathews v. Eldridge test does not apply to prejudgment garnishment and attachment. Here a fairly objective test
may be deployed to guarantee minimal constitutional fairness.
This test has a long and respected history in the area of criminal
law enforcement. The fourth amendment has enshrined it. The
draconian exclusionary rule enforces it.'3 It applies only where
the intrusion on individual interests is both (1) occasioned by exigent circumstances and (2) very brief. The exigency dictates that
the procedure be ex parte and the brevity of intrusion allows it to
be ex parte so long as, wherever possible, the principle of the
neutral magistrate is observed.

II. Tim CONCEPT
A.

OF THE NEuTRAL MAGISTRATE

The Fourth Amendment Basis

The concept of the neutral magistrate has been established in
the context of fourth amendment cases for many years. In Johnson v. United States3 the basis for the neutral magistrate principle was the requirement that the process of drawing inferences
and the cost of increased mistakes disfavoring the state (e.g., more fraudulent
claims will be paid under the proposed system, more criminals go free) or, in private litigation, mistakes disfavoring the other litigant.
32 This is the late Justice Black's warning in Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. at 345 (Black, J., dissenting).
33 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
34

333 U.S. 10 (1948).
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from evidence was to be carried out by a neutral and detached
magistrate rather than by a police officer whose judgment might
be clouded due to his engagement in the "competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime. '3 5 The Court in Giordenello v. United
States"6 stated that the function of the neutral magistrate was
not to accept mere conclusions in a complaint, but rather to judge
for himself whether
the underlying facts of the complaint show
37
probable cause.

The court further emphasized the importance of an independent judgment of the underlying facts in Aguilar v. Texas.3 8 Finally the court in United States v. Ventresca 9 cautioned against,
requiring affidavits for search warrants to conform to technical
requirements; the proper interpretation and test of such matters
Justice Jackson set out the basis for the neutral magistrate principle in the
following oft-quoted declaration:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged
in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Id. at 13-14.
35

3'357

U.S. 480 (1958).

The Court further explained:
The purpose of the complaint, then, is to enable the appropriate magistrate, here a Commissioner, to determine whether the "probable cause"
required to support a warrant exists. The Commissioner must judge for
himself the persuasiveness of the facts relied on by a complaining officer
to show probable cause. He should not accept without question the complainant's mere conclusion that the person whose arrest is sought has
committed a crime.

3"

Id. at 486.
378 U.S. 108 (1964). The Court again emphasized:
[T]he magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were
where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances
from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity
need not be disclosed, .

.

. was "credible" or his information "reliable."

Otherwise, "the inferences from the facts which lead to the complaint"
will be drawn not "by a neutral and detached magistrate," as the Constitution requires, but instead, by a police officer "engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,"

...

Id. at 114-15.
31

380 U.S. 102 (1965).
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was to be made in a "common sense and realistic fashion. '40 However this did not mean that magistrates were to accept affidavits
which were purely conclusory but rather that the magistrate be
informed of some of the underlying circumstances in the affidavit
41
to avoid becoming a mere "rubber stamp for the police.
The requirements of this neutral magistrate principle include: (1) presentation of the primary facts-the "underlying circumstances"-under oath to (2) a state official who is (a) neutral
and (b) experienced at making fact-to-law judgments or, put another way, whose usual role in the government is to make such
judgments, and (3) an independent assessment as to whether
grounds exist for the process sought-a process which will result
in a brief invasion of someone's liberty or property. A fourth requirement, generally thought to be part of this ex parte process,
is that the "grounds" be tested by a "probable cause" standard.
In sum, a neutral magistrate must make his own inference from
the primary facts that probable cause exists for issuing the
process.
Over three decades ago in McDonald v. United States,42 Mr.
Justice Douglas bluntly, but eloquently, summed up the purpose:
We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a
search warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave
emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizens and the police. This was done not to
shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal
4" The Court cautioned:
[A]ffldavits for search warrants, such as the one involved here, must be

-tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a common sense and
realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst
and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no
proper place in this area.

Id. at 108.
41 This is not to say that probable cause can be made out by affidavits
which are purely conclusory, stating only the afflant's or an informer's

belief that probable cause exists without detailing any of the "underlying circumstances" upon which that belief is based .... Recital of some
of the underlying circumstances in the affidavit is essential if the magistrate is to perform his detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police.

Id. at 109.
42 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
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activities. It was done so that an objective mind might weigh
the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law.
The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the
discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the
arrest of criminals. Power is a heady thing; and history shows
that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted. And so
the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of
the police before they violate the privacy of the home. 4'
It is not far to leap from zealous cop to zealous creditor "ferreting out" not criminals but deadbeats. The two conditions for
the application of the neutral magistrate principle also pertain to
debt collection. There is a need for immediate action before assets are dissipated or put beyond the reach of the collection pro-

cess and a seizure of very brief duration before a hearing can be
had. It only remains to demonstrate that this principle is implicit

in Sniadach's progeny: Di-Chem and Mitchell.
B.

The Basis in Civil ProceduralDue Process

In North Georgia Finishing,Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,44 Justice

White, writing for the Court, found the Georgia garhishment statute to be constitutionally deficient in allowing for the seizure of a
bank account by a "writ of garnishment issued by a court clerk
without notice or opportunity for an early hearing and without
participation by a judicial officer.' 45 Justice White distinguished
the Court's decision in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co. on the basis
that in Mitchell the Louisiana statute under attack was not constitutionally deficient due to the presence of a judge, the filing of

something more than a conclusory affidavit, and the availability
of an immediate hearing after seizure. 4 ' Those three requirements

Id. at 455-56 (emphasis added).
419 U.S. 601 (1975).
45 Id. at 606.
46 Nor is the statute saved by the more recent decision in Mitchell v. W.
T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). That case upheld the Louisiana sequestration statute which permitted the seller-creditor holding a vendor's Hen to secure a writ of sequestration and, having filed a bond, to
cause the sheriff to take possession of the property at issue. The writ,
however, was issuable only by a judge upon the filing of an affidavit
going beyond mere conclusory allegations and clearly setting out the
facts entitling the creditor to sequestration. The Louisiana law also expressly entitled the debtor to an immediate hearing after seizure and to
43

44
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present under the Louisiana statute were not found under the
Georgia statute and therefore the Georgia statute could not withstand attack.
Justice Powell's concurrence in Di-Chem has led to some
confusion as to whether the important distinction between DiChem and Mitchell is the concept of a neutral magistrate or the
concept of requiring a factual affidavit. 47 The language present in
this concurrence apparently lead Justice Flowers in Persinger
away from the concept of neutral magistrate to one of treating

dissolution of the writ absent proof by the creditor of the grounds on
which the writ was issued.
419 U.S. at 606-07 (emphasis added).
Justice White goes on to detail the faults of the Georgia statute: 38a [1] "The
affidavit ... need contain only conclusory allegations." [2] "The writ is issuable
. . .by the court clerk, without participation by a judge." 38b [3] "There is no
provision for an early hearing . . . " Id. at 607.
47 Justice Powell. concurring in the result stated: "[A]s shown by the affidavit
filed in this case, see ante, at 604 n.2, an unrevealing assertion of apprehension of
loss suffices to invoke the issuance of garnishment. This is insufficient to enable a
neutral officer to make even the most superficial preliminary assessment of the
creditor's asserted need." Id. at 612 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
This statement supports the notion that the neutral magistrate is supposed to
make an independent judgment of probable cause. Moreover, Powell asserts that:
[P]rocedural due process would be satisfied where state law requires
that the garnishment be preceded by the garnishor's provision of adequate security and by his establishment before a neutral officer of a
factual basis of the need to resort to the remedy as a means of preventing removal of dissipation of assets required to satisfy the claim. Due
process further requires that the State afford an opportunity for a
prompt postgarnishment judicial hearing ....
Id. at 611 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
However, Powell belies the inference from the above that the neutral magistrate concept is salient in his thinking with the following:
I am not in accord with the Court's suggestion that the Due Process
Clause might require that a judicial officer issue the writ of garnishment. The basic protection required for the debtor is the assurance of a
prompt postgarnishment hearing before a judge. Such a hearing affords
an opportunity to rectify any error in the initial decision to issue the
garnishment. When combined with the availability of the garnishor's
bond to compensate for any harm caused, the possibility of prompt correction of possible error suffices to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process in this context. It thus should be sufficient for a clerk or
other officer of the court to issue the original writ upon the filing of a
proper affidavit.
Id. at 611, n.3 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
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the requirement of a factual affidavit as a kind of "bill of particu48
lars" preliminary to a hearing.
A careful reading of Justice White's opinion in Mitchell v. W.
T. Grant49 should have dispelled the notion that Justice Powell's
concurrence embodied the Court's philosophy. In fact, concurring
in Mitchell, Powell stated:
In my view, the constitutional guarantee of procedural due

process is fully satisfied in cases of this kind where state law
requires, as a precondition to invoking the State's aid to sequester property of a defaulting debtor, that the creditor furnish adequate security and make a specific factual showing
before a neutral officer or magistrate of probable cause to be-

lieve that he is entitled to the relief requested. An opportunity
for an adversary hearing must then be accorded promptly after
sequestration to determine the merits50 of the controversy, with
the burden of proof on the creditor.

It is extremely important to note that Justice White, writing
for the majority in Mitchell, 1 in no uncertain terms made clear
4' 230 S.E.2d at 464.
4,

416 U.S. 600 (1974).

s 416 U.S. at 625 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
01 Justice White emphasized the factual affidavit and its function of allowing
a judicial officer to make an independent judgment:
The writ, however, will not issue on the conclusory allegationof ownership or possessory rights. Article 3501 provides that the writ of sequestration shall issue "only when the nature of the claim and the amount
thereof, if any, and the grounds relied upon for the issuance of the writ
clearly appearfrom specific facts" shown by a verified petition or affidavit. In the parish where this case arose, the clear showing required
must be made to a judge, and the writ will issue only upon his authorization and only after the creditor seeking the writ has filed a sufficient
bond to protect the vendee against all damages in the event the sequestration is shown to have been improvident.
Id. at 605-06 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
Later in his opinion he added:
The Florida law under examination in Fuentes authorized repossession of the sold goods withoutjudicial order,approval, or participation.
A writ of replevin was employed, but it was issued by the court clerk. As
the Florida law was perceived by this Court, "[t]here is no requirement
that the applicant make a convincing showing before the seizure," 407
U.S., at 73-74; the law required only "the bare assertion of the party
seeking the writ that he is entitled to one" as a condition to the clerk's
issuance of the writ. Id., at 74... The Court distinguished the Penn-
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the basis for the validity of the Louisiana statute.
[M]oreover, in the parish where this case arose, the requisite
showing must be made to a judge, and judicial authorization
obtained. Mitchell was not at the unsupervised mercy of the
creditor and court functionaries. The Louisiana law provides
for judicial control of the process from beginning to end. This
control is "one of the measures adopted by the state to minimize the risk
that the ex parte procedure will lead to a wrong'5
ful taking.

1 2

The court in Mitchell did not condemn all ex parte hearings
leading to seizure of property. However from the language above
it is clear that ex parte hearings require judicial supervision. In
effect the neutral magistrate stands between the zealous creditor
and the debtor just as in fourth amendment cases the neutral
magistrate stands between the zealous policeman and the citizen.
In two recent 5-4 decisions the Mitchell majority (Stevens, J.,
has replaced Douglas in the minority) has extended its approval
to ex parte procedures to administrative deprivations of licenses
as long as an impartial official is involved. In one a driver's license
has been suspended for 90 days, sans hearing, for refusal to take
a breathalyzer test for alcohol. In Mackey v. Montrym,58 Chief
Justice Burger stated:
And when prompt post-deprivation review is available for correction of administrative error, we have generally required no
more than that the predeprivation procedures used be
designed to provide a reasonablyreliable basis for concluding
sylvania and Florida procedures from that of the common law where,
the Court said, "a state official made at least a summary determination
of the relative rights of the disputing parties before stepping into the
dispute and taking goods from one of them." Id., at 80.
416 U.S. at 615-16 (emphasis added).
For final emphasis he added in a footnote:
The approval of a writ of sequestrationis not, as petitioner contends, a
mere ministerial act. "Since a writ of sequestration issues without a
hearing, specific facts as to the grounds relied upon for issuance must be
contained in the verified petition in order that the issuing judge can
properly evaluate the grounds." Wright v. Hughes, 254 So.2d 293, 296297 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (on rehearing).
416 U.S. at 616, n. 12 (emphasis added).
:2 416 U.S. at 616-17.
3 443 U.S. 1 (1979).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol83/iss2/5

12

McLaughlin: Essay--Prejudgment Attachments and the Concept of the Neutral Mag

1980]

ESSAY-PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENTS

215

that the facts justifying the official action are as a responsible governmental official warrants them to be."
He continued: "[a]s was the case in [Dixon v. Love], 55 the predicates for a driver's suspension under the Massachusetts scheme
are objective facts either within the personal knowledge of an impartial government official or readily ascertainable by him."56
However, the "impartial governmental official" in this case
was a police officer-a factor which seems to run counter to the
teaching of the fourth amendment cases discussed
above-protection of citizens from the biased inferences of the
zealous policeman.5 7 But the Chief Justice apparently viewed
these police officers as different from those "ferreting" out crime:
"The officer whose [corroborated] report of refusal [to take the
breathalyzer test] triggers a driver's suspension is a trained observer and investigator. He is, by reason of his training and experience, well suited to the role the statute accords him in the
presuspension process." 55
In Barry v. Barchi5' a similar result was reached in the suspension of a horse trainer's license without a hearing, because
urinalysis revealed the licensee's horse to be drugged. Justice
White said: "[I]t seems ...

that the state is entitled to impose an

interim suspension, pending a prompt judicial or administrative
hearing ...

whenever it has satisfactorily established probable

cause to believe that a horse has been drugged and that a trainer
has been at least negligent in connection with the drugging. 60° In
the Barchi Case the "board stewart" was apparently the neutral
official, and probable cause was supplied by a state testing official's test results and a statutory "rebuttable presumption or inference, that Barchi [the trainer] was at least negligent."6 1 In
both these cases, probable cause could be established with relative objectivity 2 and they were predicated on the right to an im"Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
431 U.S. 105 (1977).
443 U.S. at 13 (emphasis added).

17 Id. at 24 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 14.
" 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
'OId. at 64 (emphasis added).
61 Id. at 65.
62

In Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. at 13-14, the Chief Justice makes note of
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mediate post-suspension hearing. The dissenting justices in these
cases continue to hold out for "procedural due process" being the
equivalent of "notice and a hearing."
What then is the current status of federal law concerning
prejudgment attachments? The two 1979 cases sketched above indicate that a variant of the neutral magistrate principle applies in
the administrative law area and that notice and a hearing are not
required before temporary deprivation of "property" as long as
probable cause for the grounds for deprivation are established
before a neutral official and a hearing follows promptly. Apparently, the more objective the grounds, the less neutral the probable-cause-finding official need be. The majority purported to use
the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge6" in these cases; this
resulted in a great deal of deference to legislative judgment regarding proper procedure and the implicit balance struck with
such procedure." This is so, it seems to me, because a balancing
analysis makes the subjectiveness of the balancing process vivid,
and the Court has long recognized that such subjective judgments
are best left to the legislative process05
IH. THE ARGUMENT FOR THE NEUTRAL MAGISTRATE RULE
A. Its Certainty
The Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test has the virtue of
most ad hoc balancing tests-it is honest. Such balancing of competing interests does inform the intuition of fairness or reasonableness, however inarticulate, on which legislative policy is made
and on which it is challenged in the name of unfairness or unreasonableness by the disgruntled citizen. It also has its vice-it is
unpredictable. Its great subjectiveness leads to unpredictable results-results that seem unjudicial in character. Witness Justice
Harshbarger's remark about "judicial sophistry" in Yanero.66
This vice leads to one of two results, depending on the nature of
the policy being examined. Either it leads to slavish deference to
the legislative judgment, or, where conditions are right, it leads to
the "objective facts" on which probable cause was based.
93

424 U.S. 319 (1976).

See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10-19.
0 See text accompanying note 32, supra.
"See text accompanying note 12, supra.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol83/iss2/5

14

McLaughlin: Essay--Prejudgment Attachments and the Concept of the Neutral Mag

1980]

ESSAY-PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENTS

217

a rule-a rule based on balancing, yet balancing in advance, not
so called "ad hoc balancing."' 7 The "clear and present danger
test" is such a rule. The bill of rights is replete with constitutional rules governing the criminal process. A challenged law is
examined, not by determining whether or not the legislature
struck a reasonable balance, but whether it satisfies a constitutional rule-a rule that is the product of balancing, yet a "rule"
nonetheless.
In developing constitutional doctrine courts naturally gravitate toward constitutional rules. If an area, such as substantive
due process, will not yield a rule, then little constitutional supervision occurs and the doctrine whithers away. The development
of civil procedural due process doctrine is now at the crossroad.
That part which yields a rule will survive, and the rest will fall
into disuse. Since on the criminal side of procedural due process,
there is a well-developed rule applying to pretrial seizures, and
since this rule makes sense on the civil side, i.e., its workable and
strikes the proper balance," the Court is in the process of adopting it. It is, of course, the neutral magistrate rule of the fourth
amendment. Although, as seen in the two recent license suspension cases, this rule will be fairly flexible on the administrative
side, on the judicial side Mitchell and Di-Chem Inc. dictate a
strict rule which includes the requirements of a factual, not conclusory, affidavit and a judicial officer making an independent
judgment of probable cause for the attachment. A prompt postseizure probable cause hearing must follow. It only remains for us
to examine somewhat more fully its workability and justice, because regardless of what the United States Supreme Court does,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals need not comply if
the state standard it sets is at least as strict as the federal
standard.
B. Its Simplicity
A factual affidavit is presently required. Judicial officers and
'

See text accompanying note 13, supra.

U

See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 618-19, 625 (Powell, J., con-

curring). Remember the balancing is built into the rule, i.e., the'rule itself is a
product of balancing but nefarious, sophistry-generating ad hoc balancing is
avoided.
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a procedure for a timely hearing are presently available. All that
is needed for the West Virginia attachment and garnishment and
detinue statutes to pass federal constitutional muster is for the
judicial officer-a circuit court judge or a magistrate-to make an
independent finding of probable cause to issue the attachment or
garnishment based on the sworn facts within the affidavit(s). The
probable cause finding will have two elements in the usual attachment/garnishment situation: (a) That the plaintiff will succeed on
the merits, and (b) that defendant's assets, from which a judgment might be satisfied, will disappear if not immediately
seized.6 9 In West Virginia, the various reasons for feeling insecure
about assets are listed in the statute. The underlying facts from
which plaintiff has inferred that a statutory ground exists must
be detailed so that the neutral magistrate may make an independent judgment that the statutory ground is satisfied. It is this independent judgment-the inference of a neutral party-that protects the defendants from mistaken deprivations based on a
creditor's biased inferences. This process works in the search warrant area; it ought to work here.
C. Its Fairness
This rule strikes a fair balance between a creditor's interest
in avoiding the dissipation of assets legally answerable to her
claim and a debtor's interest in not having the use of his property
mistakenly interrupted. Notice before initial seizure may, in Justice White's words, "itself. . . furnish a warning to the debtor
acting in bad faith. '7 0 "The danger of destruction or alienation
cannot be guarded against if notice and a hearing before seizure
are supplied."' 7 1 On the other hand, if the ex parte seizure period
is very brief, and mistakes for even this brief interruption of use
are guarded against by the neutral findings of probable cause
based on sworn facts, then the defendant's interest is adequately
protected. Moreover, a bond is required to compensate defendants for any mistake actually made.

e Where plaintiff claims an ownership interest in the thing to be attached,
through a lien or security interest, then probable cause as to the merits of the
claim should be sufficient.
70 416 U.S. at 609.
71

Id.
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The neutral judgment of probable cause protects the property owner from mistaken intrusion caused by biased inferences
of probable cause. The zealous creditor's bias may cause him to
make false inferences of both the conscious and unconscious variety. By requiring a sworn statement of specific facts to be read by
a judicial officer, consciously false factual conclusions should
largely be prevented. It is easy to swear to a false legal conclusion:
"Well it was my opinion that he was about to flee the state and
everyone is entitled to his or her opinion and how can you prove
it wasn't my opinion," might say the false swearer. But if required
to swear that "I saw defendant on High Street at 3:00 p.m., Feb.
4, 1980, coming out of the travel agency at 414 High Street," an
objective fact, not an opinion, perjury can be proven. One is more
hesitant to give testimony constituting perjury.
However, it is the unconsciously false inference that the neutral magistrate chiefly prevents. Assuming the primary facts to be
true, bias can lead to false inferences of further fact. In common
parlance it is called "jumping to conclusions" or "being paranoid." Fear, anxiety, desire, etc., can skew one's judgments about
what facts "mean." The neutral magistrate can correct the
skewed judgment of the anxious creditor's "paranoid" reading of
his debtor's activity or the zealous collector's wishful reading of
the merits of his claim.
It is true that bias can lead to misperception of the primary
facts and only an evidentiary hearing can correct that. That is
why a prompt hearing must follow. Even so, the neutral magistrate provides protection in the interim that is good enough for
the brief intrusion.
Moreover, a neutral official does something more than provide increased accuracy in the finding of probable cause; the independent judgment of the neutral official also tends to promote
confidence in the fairness of the system. This is deemed important by the Supreme Court, especially the Stewart led minority.
While accuracy is the primary, perhaps sole, purpose of procedural due process-accuracy in applying general policy (law) to concrete events (fact)-it is not merely abstract accuracy as viewed
by a judge, however informed by analysis and statistics,72 but also
72 See

424 U.S. 319.
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the perception of accuracy by the average person that is essential. The vernacular for this feeling of inaccuracy is "unfair!" or
"unjust!" In Fuentes v. Shevin,7 3 where the Court was groping
toward the new doctrine of procedural due process, it spoke of
preventing "unfair and mistaken deprivations." I take it the word
"unfair" is a response to the feeling of fairness a system should
engender. Justice Stewart said recently in dissent: "[Due Process]
protects not simply against the risk of an erroneous decision. It
also protects a 'vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern
for efficiency.., that may characterize praiseworthy government
officials no less . . . than mediocre ones.' ,,74 If the "vulnerable
citizenry" feels "overborn" by official action, i.e., feels unfairly
treated because her claim gets cavalier treatment in the name of
efficiency, she loses respect for government. Thus, not only is engendering a feeling of fairness in the citizenry an end in itself, it
also promotes a respect for, and thus peaceful acceptance of, governmental decision-making.
In other words, if a legislature or reviewing court is persuaded'that a procedure is 100% accurate, the inquiry does not
stop there. How that procedure will be viewed by the general
public must also be gauged. If that public views it as only 50%
accurate (no matter how erroneous that judgment might be) and
thus views it as "unfair," then the procedure should probably be
rejected. This is not unlike the lawyerly concern for not only impropriety but for the appearance of impropriety.
In our tradition of justice, a hearing is the best guarantee
that the person adversely affected will feel fairly treated. Apparently, what divides the United States Supreme Court right now
relates to the relative importance of this "feeling of fairness" as
an ingredient of procedural due process and how well that "feeling" can be appeased with something other than a hearing. The
majority apparently values the "feeling" of the citizenry somewhat lower than the minority does or feels that a hearing is somewhat less essential to the "feeling of fairness" than does the mi73 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972).
74 443 U.s. at 20 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.,
446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980). Justice Marshall states that "[a neutral hearing officer]
preserves both the appearance and reality of fairness, 'generating the feeling, so
important to popular government, that justice has been done,' Joint Anti-Fascist
Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)."
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nority, or, as I suspect, a little of each.
A minority of four holds out for a preseizure hearing in every
case, while the majority finds the neutral magistrate (or neutral
official in the administrative setting) adequate for short deprivations. History, common sense, and legislative judgment tend to
support the notion that the neutral magistrate promotes the feeling of fairness. The history of the warrant issued by the neutral
magistrate is ancient and revered. It is central to fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Furthermore, it makes sense that a debtor whose property is taken
briefly without a hearing will feel better if he knows the state has
at least evaluated the asserted grounds for taking and not acted
merely as an agent for the private creditor. Finally, the legislature's judgment at both the federal and state levels has consistently favored no more than the neutral magistrate's judgment for
brief ex parte intrusions, whether for warrants, temporary restraining orders, or attachments. In West Virginia less than the
neutral magistrate has long been allowed for attachments.
Since judging the community's sense of fairness is a highly
subjective matter, it naturally should be left to the legislature and
checked only when patently without a rational basis. Less deference should be paid to rules generated by the administrative process, however.
Finally, in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., Justice White voiced
two concerns about requiring a hearing before even temporary
deprivations: (1) it might increase the price of credit and (2) increase the use of self-help repossession.7 5 Since then in Flagg
Bros., Inc. v. Brooks7e the United States Supreme Court has held
such self-help remedies not to be state action and thus immune
from due process scrutiny. The West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals had previously reached the same decision.7 The sad
irony is that many efforts to relieve debtors in individual cases
result in a general reduction in the availability of credit-the
more difficult to collect the more reluctant to lend. And credit
drys from the bottom up. It would be sad irony, indeed, if a deci-

416 U.S. at 618 including n.13.
78436 U.S. 149 (1978).
7 Cook v. Lilly, 208 S.E.2d 784 (W. Va. 1974).
75
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sion, like State ex rel. Yanero v. Fox,78 designed to protect
debtors, resulted in less credit, obtainable only where a security
interest was provided, thus guaranteeing no protection at all
before seizure.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The fourteenth amendment requires the independent judgment of probable cause by a neutral magistrate based on sworn ex
parte facts before even a brief seizure of property takes place.
Persinger v. Edwin Associates, Inc.7 9 was wrongly decided. This
neutral magistrate rule is a simple rule, requiring no balancing;
the balancing of interests is built into the rule. It promotes the
twin procedural due process ends of sufficient accuracy under the
circumstances and the perception of accuracy called here the
"feeling of fairness." History, commonsense, and legislative judgment support its fairness and reasonableness. It strikes a proper
balance. The alternative of a hearing everytime will make credit
less available to the poor and then mostly on self-help repossession terms, providing no protection at all. State ex rel. Yanero v.
Fox goes farther than is necessary or wise. Hopefully, the legislature will give the courts of West Virginia some new legislation in
the near future, bringing under one simple but comprehensive
regulation all the prejudgment remedies.8 0

256 S.E.2d 751 (W. Va. 1979).
• 230 S.E.2d 460 (W. Va. 1976).
See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 618, n. 13 for a listing of some
of the studies and proposals for such a law.
78
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